Bully for Brontosaurus Page 25
Sidney’s second ingredient, his tale of a week-long search for the mother lode (cited previously in this essay), is equally false from the evidence of Walcott’s diary, and similarly read into memory from the repetition of legend, not the recall of actual events.
Why am I bothering with all this detail? To be sure, truth has a certain moral edge over falsehood, but few people care much about corrections to stories they never heard about people they never knew. If the only lesson in this little reversal of Burgess orthodoxy exhorts us to be careful lest a tendency to embellish or romanticize stifle the weakly flickering flame of truth, then this essay is as banal as the sentence I just wrote. But I would defend my effort on two grounds. First, the Burgess animals happen to be the world’s most important fossils, and the purely factual issues surrounding their discovery therefore demand more than the usual care and attention to accuracy. We might not challenge a family legend about Uncle Joe in the interests of domestic peace and benevolence, but we really would like to know how Jesus lived and died because different views have had such palpable effects upon billions of lives. Second, I believe that our tendencies to construct legends raise an issue far more interesting than watchdog warnings about eternal verity.
I would begin by asking why almost every canonical tale is false in the same way—a less interesting reality converted to a simple story with a message. Do we need these stories so badly because life isn’t heroic or thrilling most of the time? Sean O’Casey said that the stage must be larger than life, and few poets or playwrights can succeed by fidelity to the commonplace. It takes the artistry of James Joyce to make a masterpiece from one day in the life of an ordinary man. Most of our existence is eating, sleeping, walking, and breathing. Even the life of a soldier, if expressed in real time, would be almost uninterrupted tedium—for an old motto identifies this profession as long periods of boredom interspersed with short moments of terror.
Astute scientists understand that political and cultural bias must impact their ideas, and they strive to recognize these inevitable influences. But we usually fail to acknowledge another source of error that might be called literary bias. So much of science proceeds by telling stories—and we are especially vulnerable to constraints of this medium because we so rarely recognize what we are doing. We think that we are reading nature by applying rules of logic and laws of matter to our observations. But we are often telling stories—in the good sense, but stories nonetheless. Consider the traditional scenarios of human evolution—tales of the hunt, of campfires, dark caves, rituals, and toolmaking, coming of age, struggle and death. How much is based on bones and artifacts and how much on the norms of literature?
If these reconstructions are stories, then they are bound by the rules of canonical legendmaking. And if we construct our stories to be unlike life—the main point of this essay—then our literary propensities are probably derailing our hope to understand the quotidian reality of our evolution. Stories only go in certain ways—and these paths do not conform to patterns of actual life.
This constraint does not apply only to something so clearly ripe for narration and close to home as “the rise of man from the apes” (to choose a storylike description that enfolds biases of gender and progress into its conventionality). Even the most distant and abstract subjects, like the formation of the universe or the principles of evolution, fall within the bounds of necessary narrative. Our images of evolution are caught in the web of tale telling. They involve progress, pageant; above all, ceaseless motion somewhere. Even revisionist stories that question ideas of gradual progress—the sort that I have been spinning for years in these essays—are tales of another kind about good fortune, unpredictability, and contingency (the kingdom lost for want of a horseshoe nail). But focus on almost any evolutionary moment, and nothing much is happening. Evolution, like soldiering and life itself, is daily repetition almost all the time. Evolutionary days may be generations, but as the Preacher said, one passeth away and another cometh, but the earth abideth forever. The fullness of time, of course, does provide a sufficient range for picking out rare moments of activity and linking them together into a story. But we must understand that nothing happens most of the time—and we don’t because our stories don’t admit this theme—if we hope to grasp the dynamics of evolutionary change. (This sentence may sound contradictory, but it isn’t. To know the reasons for infrequent change, one must understand the ordinary rules of stability.) The Burgess Shale teaches us that, for the history of basic anatomical designs, almost everything happened in the geological moment just before, and almost nothing in more than 500 million years since.
Included in this “almost nothing,” as a kind of geological afterthought of the last few million years, is the first development of self-conscious intelligence on this planet—an odd and unpredictable invention of a little twig on the mammalian evolutionary bush. Any definition of this uniqueness, embedded as it is in our possession of language, must involve our ability to frame the world as stories and to transmit these tales to others. If our propensity to grasp nature as story has distorted our perceptions, I shall accept this limit of mentality upon knowledge, for we receive in trade both the joys of literature and the core of our being.
6 | Down Under
17 | Glow, Big Glowworm
SMALL MISUNDERSTANDINGS are often a prod to insight or victory. For such a minor error with major consequences, Laurel and Hardy got into terminal trouble with the toymaster in March of the Wooden Soldiers—they got fired for building 100 soldiers six feet high, when Santa had ordered 600 at one foot. But the six-footers later saved Toyland from the invasion of Barnaby and his bogeymen.
In insects that undergo a complete metamorphosis, cells that will form adult tissues are already present in the bodies of larvae as isolated patches called imaginal disks. For many years, I regarded this term as one of the oddest in all biology—for I always read “imaginal” as “imaginary” and thought I was being told that this substrate of maturity really didn’t exist at all.
When I learned the true origin of this term, I realized that I had not only misunderstood but had made an absolutely backward interpretation. I also discovered that my resolution had taught me something interesting—about ways of looking at the world, not about any facts of nature per se—and I therefore judged my former error as fruitful.
Linnaeus himself, father of taxonomy, named the stages of insect development. He designated the feeding stage that hatched from the egg as a larva (the caterpillar of a moth or the maggot of a housefly), and he called the sexually mature adult an imago, hence imaginal disk for precursors of adult tissues within the larva.
The etymologies of these terms provided my insight—a larva is a mask; an imago, the image or essential form of a species. Linnaeus, in other words, viewed the development of insects as progress toward fulfillment. The first stage is only preparatory; it hides the true and complete representation of a species. The final form embodies the essence of louseness, thripsness, or flyness. Imaginal disks, by both etymology and concept, are bits of higher reality lurking within initial imperfection—no sign of “let’s pretend” here.
Most impediments to scientific understanding are conceptual locks, not factual lacks. Most difficult to dislodge are those biases that escape our scrutiny because they seem so obviously, even ineluctably, just. We know ourselves best and tend to view other creatures as mirrors of our own constitution and social arrangements. (Aristotle, and nearly two millennia of successors, designated the large bee that leads the swarm as a king.)
Few aspects of human existence are more basic than our life cycle of growth and development. For all the glories of childhood, we in the West have generally viewed our youngsters as undeveloped and imperfect adults—smaller, weaker, and more ignorant. Adulthood is a termination; childhood, an upward path. How natural, then, that we should also interpret the life cycles of other organisms as a linear path from imperfect potential to final realization—from the small, ill-formed creature
that first develops from an egg to the large and complex fruition that produces the egg of the next generation.
How obvious, in particular, that insect larvae are imperfect juveniles and imagoes realized adults. Linnaeus’s etymology embodies this traditional interpretation imposed from human life upon the development of insects. When we combine this dubious comparison of human and insect life cycles with our more general preference for viewing developmental sequences as ladders of progress (a prejudice that has hampered our understanding of evolution even more than our resolution of embryology), insect larvae seem doomed to easy dismissal by an aggregation of biases—etymological, conceptual, and parochial.
If we turn to two leading works of popular science, published five years after Darwin’s Origin of Species—one on life cycles in general, the other on insects—we obtain a good sense of these traditional biases. A. de Quatrefages, great French student of that economic leader among insect larvae, the silkworm, wrote in his Metamorphosis of Man and the Lower Animals (1864) that “larvae…are always incomplete beings; they are true first sketches, which are rendered more and more perfect at each developmental phase.”
An Introduction to Entomology, by William Kirby, rector of Barham, and William Spence, wins first prize among British works of popular science for celebrity, for longevity (its first edition appeared in 1815), and for prose in the most preciously purple tradition of “nature writing,” as satirized by example in James Joyce’s Ulysses: “Note the meanderings of some purling rill as it babbles on its way, fanned by the gentlest zephyrs tho’ quarrelling with the stony obstacles, to the tumbling waters of Neptune’s blue domain….” To which, Mr. Dedalus replies: “Agonizing Christ, wouldn’t it give you a heartburn on your arse.” And for which (among other things) Ulysses was once banned from the United States as obscene—although I would sooner exclude that purling rill than a heartburn on any part of the anatomy.
In their first post-Darwinian edition (1863), Kirby and Spence make no bones about their preference for well-formed imagoes and their distaste for grubby larvae (a redundancy for emphasis of my point—grubs are larvae, and we owe this adjective to the same prejudice):
That active little fly, now an unbidden guest at your table, whose delicate palate selects your choicest viands, while extending his proboscis to the margin of a drop of wine, and then gaily flying to take a more solid repast from a pear or peach; now gamboling with his comrades in the air, now gracefully currying his furled wings with his taper feet, was but the other day a disgusting grub, without wings, without legs, without eyes, wallowing, well pleased, in the midst of a mass of excrement.
The adult, they write, is called an imago “because, having laid aside its mask [larva], and cast off its swaddling bands [the pupal cocoon, or chrysalis], being no longer disguised [larva] or confined [pupa], or in any other respect imperfect, it is now become a true representative or image of its species.”
The burden of metaphor becomes immeasurably heavier for larvae when Kirby and Spence then drag out that oldest of all insect analogies from an age of more pervasive Christianity—the life cycle of a butterfly to the passage of a soul from first life in the imperfect prison of a human body (larval caterpillar), to death and entombment (pupal chrysalis), to the winged freedom of resurrection (imago, or butterfly). This simile dates to the great Dutch biologist Jan Swammerdam, child of Cartesian rationalism but also, at heart, a religious mystic, who first discovered the rudimentary wings of butterflies, enfurled in late stages of larval caterpillars. Swammerdam wrote near the end of the seventeenth century: “This process is formed in so remarkable a manner in butterflies, that we see therein the resurrection painted before our eyes, and exemplified so as to be examined by our hands.” Kirby and Spence then elaborated just a bit:
To see a caterpillar crawling upon the earth sustained by the most ordinary kinds of food, which when…its appointed work being finished, passes into an intermediate state of seeming death, when it is wound up in a kind of shroud and encased in a coffin, and is most commonly buried under the earth…then, when called by the warmth of the solar beam, they burst from their sepulchres, cast off their raiments…come forth as a bride out of her chamber—to survey them, I say, arrayed in their nuptial glory, prepared to enjoy a new and more exalted condition of life, in which all their powers are developed, and they are arrived at the perfection of their nature…who that witnesses this interesting scene can help seeing in it a lively representation of man in his threefold state of existence…. The butterfly, the representative of the soul, is prepared in the larva for its future state of glory;…it will come to its state of repose in the pupa, which is its Hades; and at length, when it assumes the imago, break forth with new powers and beauty to its final glory and the reign of love.
But must we follow this tradition and view larvae as harbingers of better things? Must all life cycles be conceptualized as paths of progress leading to an adult form? Human adults control the world’s media—and the restriction of this power to one stage of our life cycle imposes a myopic view. I would be happy to counter this prejudice (as many have) by emphasizing the creativity and specialness of human childhood, but this essay speaks for insects.
I will admit that our standard prejudice applies, in one sense, to creatures like ourselves. Our bodies do grow and transform in continuity. A human adult is an enlarged version of its own childhood; we grown-ups retain the same organs, reshaped a bit and often increased a great deal. (Many insects with simple life cycles, or so-called incomplete metamorphoses, also grow in continuity. This essay treats those insects that cycle through the classic stages of complete metamorphosis: egg, larva, pupa, and imago.)
But how can we apply this bias of the upward path to complex life cycles of other creatures? In what sense is the polyp of a cnidarian (the phylum of corals and their allies) more—or less—complete than the medusa that buds from its body? One stage feeds and grows; the other mates and lays eggs. They perform different and equally necessary functions. What else can one say? Insect larvae and imagoes perform the same division—larvae eat and imagoes reproduce. Moreover, larvae do not grow into imagoes by increase and complication of parts. Instead, larval tissues are sloughed off and destroyed during the pupal stage, while the imago largely develops from small aggregations of cells—the imaginal disks of this essay’s beginning—that resided, but did not differentiate, within the larva. Degenerating larval tissues are often used as a culture medium for growth of the imago within the pupa. Larva and imago are different and discrete, not before and shadowy versus later and complete.
Even Kirby and Spence sensed this true distinction between objects equally well suited for feeding and reproduction, though they soon buried their insight in cascading metaphors about progress and resurrection:
Were you…to compare the internal conformation of the caterpillar with that of the butterfly, you would witness changes even more extraordinary. In the former you would find some thousands of muscles, which in the latter are replaced by others of a form and structure entirely different. Nearly the whole body of the caterpillar is occupied by a capacious stomach. In the butterfly it has become converted into an almost imperceptible thread-like viscus; and the abdomen is now filled by two large packets of eggs.
If we break through the tyranny of our usual bias, to a different view of larvae and imagoes as separate and potentially equal devices for feeding and reproduction, many puzzles are immediately resolved. Each stage adapts in its own way, and depending upon ecology and environment, one might be emphasized, the other degraded to insignificance in our limited eyes. The “degraded” stage might be the imago as well as the larva—more likely, in fact, since feeding and growth can be rushed only so much, but mating, as poets proclaim, can be one enchanted evening. Thus, I used to feel sorry for the mayfly and its legendary one day of existence, but such brevity only haunts the imago, and longer-lived larvae also count in the total cycle of life. And what about the seventeen-year “locust” (actually a cica
da)? Larvae don’t lie around doing nothing during this dog’s age, waiting patiently for their few days of visible glory. They have an active life underground, including long stretches of dormancy to be sure, but also active growth through numerous molts.
Thus, we find our best examples of an alternative and expansive view of life cycles among species that emphasize the size, length, and complexity of larval life at the apparent expense of imaginal domination—where, to borrow Butler’s famous line with only minor change in context, a hen really does seem to be the egg’s way of manufacturing another egg. I recently encountered a fine case during a visit to New Zealand—made all the more dramatic because human perceptions focus entirely upon the larva and ignore the imago.
After you leave the smoking and steaming, the boiling and puffing, the sulfurous stench of geysers, fumaroles, and mud pots around Rotorua, you arrive at the second best site on the standard tourist itinerary of the North Island—the glowworm grotto of Waitomo Cave. Here, in utter silence, you glide by boat into a spectacular underground planetarium, an amphitheater lit with thousands of green dots—each the illuminated rear end of a fly larva (not a worm at all). (I was dazzled by the effect because I found it so unlike the heavens. Stars are arrayed in the sky at random with respect to the earth’s position. Hence, we view them as clumped into constellations. This may sound paradoxical, but my statement reflects a proper and unappreciated aspect of random distributions. Evenly spaced dots are well ordered for cause. Random arrays always include some clumping, just as we will flip several heads in a row quite often so long as we can make enough tosses—and our sky is not wanting for stars. The glowworms, on the other hand, are spaced more evenly because larvae compete with, and even eat, each other—and each constructs an exclusive territory. The glowworm grotto is an ordered heaven.)